THE
CAUSAL MODE of description has deep roots in our conscious endeavors to utilize experience for practical adjustment to our environments, and is in this way inherently incorporated in common language. By the guidance mrhich analysis in terms of cause and effect has off ered in many fields of human knowledge, the principle of czeusality has evell come to stand as the ideal for scientifie e2rplanation.
In physics, causal deseription, originally adapted to She problems of mechanics, rests on the assllmption that the lmowledge of the state of a material system at a given time permits the prediction of its state at any subsequent tim*e. Here, however, already the definition of state requires special consideration and it need hardly be recalled that an adequate analysis of mechanical phenomena was possible only after the recognition that, in the account of a state of a system of bodies, not tnerely their location at a given moment but also tlleir velocities have to be included.
In elassical mechanics, the forces between bodies were assumed to depend simply on the instantaneous positions and velocities; but the discovery of the retardation of electromagnetic effects made it necessary to consider force fields as an essential part of a physical system, and to include in the dessription of the state of the system at a given time the specification of these fields in every point of space. lCet, as is well known, the establishment of the differential equations connecting the rate of variation of electromagnetic intensities in space and time has made possible a description of electromagnetic phenomena in complete analogy to eausal analysis in meehanics.
It is true that, from the point of view of relativistic argumentation, such attributes of physical objects as position and velocity of material bodies, and even electric or magnetic field intensities, can no longer be given an absolute content. Still, relativity theory, which has endued classioal physies with unpreeedented unity and scope, has just through its elucidation of the conditions for the unambiguous use of elementary physical concepts allowed a concise formulation of tWe principle of causality along most general lines.
However, a wholly new situation in physical scienae was created through the discovery of the universal quantum of action, which revealed an elementary feature of "individuality" of atomic processes far beyond the old doetrine of the limited divisibility of matter originally introduced as a foundation for a causal explanation of the speciSe properties of mat@-rial substances. This novel feature is not only entirely foreign to the classical theories of mechanies and electromagnetism, but is even irreconcilable with the very idea of causality.
In fact, the specification of the state of a physical system evidently cannot determine the choice betwe¢n dififerent individual proeesses of transition to other states, and an account of quantum effects must thus basieally operate with the notion of the probabilities of occurrence of the difEerent possible transition processes. We have here to do with a situation essentially different in character from the recourse to statistieal methods in the practical dealing with complieated systems that are assumed to obey laws of classical mechanies.
The e2rtent to which ordinary physical pictures fail in accounting for atolziie phenomena is strikingly illustraid by the well-known dilemma concerning the corpuseular and lvave properties of material particles as well as of eleetromagnetic radiation. It is further important to realize that any determination of Planek's constant rests upon the comparison between aspects of the phenomena which-ean be deseribed only by means of pictures not combinable on the basis of classical physical theories. These theories indeed represent merely idealizations of asymptotic validity in the limit where the actions involved in any stage of the analysis of the phenomena are large compared with the elementary quantum.
In this situation, we are £aced with the necessity of a radical revision of the foundation for description and explanation of physieal phenomena. must above all be recognized that, however far quantum effects transcend the scope of classical physical analysis, the account of the experimental arrangement and the record of the observations must always be expressed in common language supplemented with the terminology of classical -physics. This is a simple logical demand, since the word "experiment" can in essence be used only in referring to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned.
The very fact that quantum phenomena cannot be analyzed on classical linesithus implies the impossibility of separating a behavior of atomic objects from the interaction of these objects with the measuring instruments which serve to specify the conditions under which the phenomena appear. In particular, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt at subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement, introducing new sources of uncontrollable interaction between objects and measuring instruments.
In this situation, an inherent element of ambiguity is involved in assigning conventional physical attributes to atomic objects. A clear example of such an ambiguity is offered by the dilemma mentioned, as to the properties of electrons or photons, where we are faced with the contrast revealed by the comparison between observations regarding an atomic object, obtained by means of different experimental arrangements. Such empirical evidence exhibits a novel type of relationship, which has no analogue in classical' physics and which may conveniently be termed consplewDentartty in order to stress that in the contrasting phenomena we have to do with equally essential aspects of all well-defined knowledge about the objects.
An adequate tool for the complementary mode of description is offered by the quantum-mechanical formalism, in which the canonical equations of classical mechanics are retained while the physical variables are replaced by symbolic operators subjected to a noncommutative algebra. In this formalism Planck's constant enters only in the commutation relations qp-pq=v-l2
(1) between the symbols q and p standing for a pair of conjugate variables, or in the equivalent representation by means of the substitutions of the type | hd p=-\/-l 2 ,3
by which one of each set of conjugate variables is replaced by a diSerential operator. According to the two alternative procedures, quantum-mechanical calculations may be performed either by representing the variables by matrices with elements referring to the individual transitions between two states of the system or by making use of the so-called wave equation, the solutions of which refer to these states and allow us to derive probabilities for the transitions between them. The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions, of definite or statistical character, as regards information obtainable under experimental conditions described .in classical terms and specified by means of parameters entering into the algebraic or differential equations of which the matrices or the wave functions, respectively, are solutions. These symbols themselves, as is indicated already by the use of imaginary numbers, are not susceptible to pictorial interpretation; and even derived real functions like densities and currents are only to be regarded as expressing the probabilities for the occutrence of individual events observable under well-defined experimental conditions.
A characteristic feature of the quantum-mechanical description is that the representation of a state of a system can never imply the accurate determination of both members of a pair of conjugate variables q and p. In fact, due to the noncommutability of such variables, as expressed by (1) and (2), there will always be a reciprocal relation between the latitudes Sq and Ap with which these variables can be fixed. These so-called indeterminacy relations explicitly bear out the limitation of causal analysis, but it is important to recognize that no unambiguous interpretation of such relations can be given in words suited to describe a situation in which physical attributes are objectified in a classical way.
Thus, a sentence like "we cannot know both the momentum and the position of an electron" raises at once questions as to the physical reality of such two attributes, which can be answered only by referring to the mutually exclusive conditions for the unambiguous use of space-time coordination, on the one hand, and dynamical conservation laws, on the other. In fact, any attempt at locating atomic objects in space and time demands an experimental arrangement involving an exchange of momentum and energy, uncontrollable in principle, between the objects and the scales and clocks defining the reference frame. Conversely, no arrangement suitable for the eontrol of momentum and energy balance will admit precise description of the phenomena as a chain of events in space and time.
Strictly speaking, every reference to dynamical concepts implies a classical mechanical analysis of physical evidence which ultimately rests on the recording of space-time coincidences. Thus, also in the descrip-tion of atomic phenomena, use of momentum and energy variables for-the specification of initial conditions and final observations refers implicitly to such analysis and therefore demands that the experimental arrangements used for the purpose have spatixll dimensions and operate with time intervals sufficiently large to permit the neglect of the reciprocal indeterminacy expressed by (3). Under these circumstances it is, of GOurSe, to a certain degree a matter of convenience to what extent the elassical aspects of th0 phenomena are ineluded in the proper quantum-mechanical treatment where a distinction in principle is made between measuring instrllments, the description of which must always be based on space-time pictures, and objects under investigation, about which observable predictions can in general be derived only by the nonvisualizable formalism.
Incidentally, it may be remarked that the construction and the functioning of all apparatus like diaphragms and shutters, serving to define geometry and timing of the experimental arrangements, or photographic plates used for recording the localization of atomic objects, will depend on properties of materials whieh are themselves essentially determined by the quantum of action. Still, this circumstance is irrelevant for the study of simple atomic phenomena where, in the specification of the experimental conditions, we may to a very high degree of approximation disregard the molecular constitution of the measuring instruments. If only the instruments are sufficiently heavy compared with the atomic objects under investigation, we can in particular neglect the requirements of relation (3) as regards the control of the localization in space and time of the single pieces of apparatus relative to each other.
In representing a generalization of classical mechanics suitedwto allow for the existence of the quantum of action, quantum mechanics offers a frame sufRciently wide to account for empirical regularities which cannot be comprised in the tlassieal way of description. Besides the characteristic features of atomic stability, which gave the first impetus to the development of quantum mechanics, we may here refer to the peculiar regularities exhibited by systems composed of identical entities, such as photons or electrons, and determining for radiative equilibrium or essential properties of material substances. As is well known, these regularities are adequately described by the symmetry properties of the wave functions representing the state of the whole systems. Of course, such problems cannot be explored by any experimental arrangement suited for the tracing in space and time of each of the identical entities separately.
It is furthermore instructive to consider the conditions for the determination of positional and dynamical variables in a state of a system with several atomic constituents. In fact, although any pair7 q and p, of conjugate space and momentum variables obeys the rule of noncommutative multiplication expressed by (1), and thus can be fixed only with reciprocal latitudes given by ( 3), the difference ql -q2 between the space coordinates referring to two constituents of a system will commute with the sum P1 + P2 of the corresponding momentum components, as follows directly from the commutability of ql with P2 and of q2 with P1-Both ql-q2 and P1+P2 can, therefore, be accurately fixed in a state of the complex system and we can consequently predict the value of either q1 or P1 if either q2 or P2 respectively, is determined by direct measurement. Since at the moment of measurement the direct interaction between the objects may have ceased, it might thus appear that both ql and P1 were to be regarded as well-defined physical attributes of the isolated object and that, therefore, as has been argued, the quantum-mechanical representation o£ a state should not offer an adequate means of a complete description of physical reality. With regard to such an argument, however, it must be stressed that any two arrangements which admit accurate measurements of q2 and P2 will be mutually exclusive and that therefore predictions as regards q1 or P1 respectively, will pertain to phenomena which basically are of complementary character.
As regards the question of the completeness of the quantum-mechanical mode of deseription, it must be recognized that we are dealing with a mathematically consistent scheme which is adapted within its scope to every process of measurement and the adequacy of which can be judged only from a comparison of the predicted results with actual observations. In this connection, it is essential to note that, in any welldefined application of quantum mechanics, it is necessary to specify the whole e2cperimental arrangement and that, in particular, the possibility of disposing of the parameters defining the quantum-mechanical problem just corresponds to our freedom of constructing and handling the measuring apparatus, which in turn means the freedom to choose between the different complementary types of phenomena we wish to study.
In order to avoid logical inconsistencies in the account of this unfamiliar situation, great care in all questions of terminology and dialectics is obviously imperative. Thus, phrases often found in the physical literature, like ;;disturbance of phenomena by observation'2 or ';creation of physical attributes of objects by measurements," represent a use of words like phetsomenc6 and observastzon as well as attrsbqete and fneasuremetst which is hardly compatible with common usage and practical definition and, therefore, is apt to cause confusion. As a more appropriate way of e2rpression, one may strongly advoeate limitation of the use of the word phenornenon to refer exelusively to observations obtained under speeified eireumstanees, ineluding an aeeount of the whole experiment.
With this terminology, the observational problem in atomic physies is free of any speeial intrieaey, sinee in aetual experiments all evidenee pertains to observations obtained under reprodueible eonditions and is expressed by unambiguous statements referring to the registration of the point at whieh an atomie partiele arrives on a photographie plate or to a eorrespondint, reeord of some other aluplifieation deviee. Moreover, the ¢ireumstanee that all sueh observations involve proeesses of essentially irreversible eharaeter lends to eaeh phenomenon just that inherent featura of eompletion whieh is demanded for its well-defined interpretation within the framework of quantum meehanies.
Recapitulating, the impossibility of subdividing the individual quantum eSeets and of separating a behavior of the objects froin their interaetion with the lneasuring instruments sernng to define the eonditions under wvhieh the phenomena appear implies an ambiguity in assigning eonventional attributes to atomie objeets whieh ealls for a reconsideration of our attitude towards the problem of physieal explanation. In this novel situation, even the old question of an ultimate determinaey of natural phenomena has lost its eoneeptional basis, and it is against this baekground that the viewpoint of eonlplementarity presents itself as a rational generalization of the very ideal of eausality.
The eomplementary mode of deseription does indeed not involve any arbitrary renuneiation of eustomary demands of explanation but, on the eontrary, aims at an appropriate dialeetie expression for the aetual eonditions of analysis and synthesis in atomie physies. Ineidentally, it would seenl that the reeourse to threevalued logie, sometimes proposed as means for dealing with the paradoxieal features of quantum theory, is not suited to give a elearer aeeount of the situation, sinee all well-defined experimental evidenee, even if it eannot be analyzed in tertns of elassieal pllysies, must be expressed in ordinary language making use of eommon lot,ic.
The epistemolot,ieal lesson we have reeeived from the new development in physieal seience, where the problems enable a eomparatively eoncise formulation of prineiples, may also suggest lines of approaeh in other domains of knowledge where the situation is of essentially less aecessible eharaeter. An example Ls offered in biology, where meehanistic and vitalistie arguments are used in a typieally eomplementary manner. In soeiolot,y, too, sueh dialeeties may oftexI be useful, partieularly in problems eonfronting us in the study and eoznparison of human cultures, xvhere we have to eope with the element of eomplaeeney inherent in every national eulture and manifesting itself in prejudiees whieh obviously eannot be appreeiated from the standpoint of other nations.
Reeognition of eomplementary relationship is not least required in psyehology, where the eonditions for analysis and synthesis of experienee exhibit striking analogy with the situation in atomie physi. In fact, the use of words like thoql,ghts and sentiments, equally indispensable to illustrate the diversity of psyehieal experienee, pertain to mutually exelusive situations eharaeterized by a different drawing of tle line of separation between subjeet and objeet. In partieular, the plaee left for the feeling of volition is aSorded by the very eireumstanee that situations where we experienee freedom of will are ineompatible with psyehologieal situations where eausal analysis is reasonably attempted. In other words, when we use the phrase "I will" we renounee explanatory argumentation.
Altogether, the approaeh towards the problem of explanation that is embodied in the notion of eomplementarity suggests itself in our position as eonseious beings and reealls foreefully the teaehing of aneient thinkers that, in the seareh for a harmonious attitude towards life, it must never be forgotten that we ourselves are both aetors and speetators in the drama of existenee. To sueh an utteranee applies, of eourse, as well as to most of the sentenees in this artiele from the beginning to the end, the reeognition that our task ean only be to aim at eommunieating experienees and views to others by means of language, in whieh the praetieal use of every word stands in a eomplementary relation to attempts of its striet definition.
